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COMMENT
AN ANALYSIS AND REVIEW OF SCHOOL FINANCING REFORM
I.

INTRODUCTION

Consider a taxing scheme where the wealth of a district is measured by the
aggregate assessed property valuation in that district and where people living
in poor districts are taxed at a higher rate than those living in more wealthy
districts. Also consider that in the system just described, those who are taxed
at the lower rate are able to spend more for educating their children than
those who are taxed at the higher rate because they happen to live in
wealthier districts. For example, in New York, for the same tax rate of $2.72
per $100 of assessed valuation, the town of Great Neck is able to spend 80
percent more per student for education than is Levittown.' This is so because
Great Neck, with its greater property wealth, is able to raise nearly twice as
much money for education as Levittown, which has less property wealth and,
consequently, a smaller tax base upon which to draw.
The above described system illustrates the dominant financing scheme for
elementary and secondary education in the United States. 2 Under such a
system, revenues for education are raised predominantly by local property
taxation. There are three major factors which determine how much a local
school district is able to raise per pupil for education: (1) the overall assessed
property valuation in the district subject to taxation; (2) the rate at which the
local community is willing to tax itself; and (3) the total number of school age
children in the district. The overall per pupil expenditure for education is then
usually supplemented by some form of aid from the state government. 3
One of the first court challenges to an existing system of school financing
was Mclnnis v. Shapiro.4 In McInnis, a group of students brought an action
in federal court alleging that various Illinois statutes pertaining to the
financing of education in that state violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment since the statutes resulted in wide variations in per
pupil expenditures from one school district to another.S Acknowledging that
such inequality existed, the court nonetheless said that before any violation of
the equal protection clause could be found, plaintiffs had to show that any
classification made rested upon grounds that were wholly irrelevant to a valid
state purpose. 6 Applying this standard, the court found that the statutes were
1. New York State Commission on the Quality, Cost, and Financing of Elementary and
Secondary Education, The Fleischmann Report on the Quality, Cost, and Financing of Elementary and Secondary Education in New York State 137 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Fleischmann
Report].
2. J. Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugarman, Private Wealth and Public Education 2 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Private Wealth].
3. See notes 53-61 infra and accompanying text.
4. 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. MII.1968), affd per curiam sub nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S.
322 (1969).

5.
6.

Id. at 328-29.
Id. at 332.
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constitutional since they were designed to allow localities to determine the
amount of education they wanted to provide. 7 The court found further that
the state's desire to permit local decision making was a valid state purpose. 8
As to plaintiffs' claim that "only a financing system which apportions public
funds according to the educational needs of the students satisfies the Fourteenth Amendment," 9 the court ruled that no discoverable and manageable
standards existed by which it could determine whether the Constitution was
violated.10 The United States Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decision. II
This Comment will first discuss various standards proposed by financing
reformers to gauge equal educational opportunity and will consider the major
financing schemes that are in existence. Secondly, it will review various
attempts to reform educational financing through the courts. Finally, it will
review avenues of reform that are still open through the judiciary in light of
the Supreme Court's decision in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, 12 and present an alternative plan for reforming school financing.
II.
IN SEARCH OF A STANDARD
As indicated earlier, plaintiffs in Mclnnis alleged that the fourteenth
amendment dictated that educational expenditures be distributed according to
the educational needs of the pupils rather than the wealth of the district
wherein they resided. The court found the concept of equal educational
13
opportunity elusive and beyond the judicial competence of the court.
Although the court did comment that "[p]resumably, students receiving a
$1000 education are better educated that [sic] those acquiring a $600 schooling,"1 4 such a presumption has not been universally accepted. 15
One of the most controversial findings of the Coleman Report,1 6 a survey
on educational opportunities ordered by Congress, was that beyond some
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 332-33.
Id. at 333-34.
Id. at 331 (emphasis omitted).
10. Id. at 335.
11. 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
12. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
13. 293 F. Supp. at 335-36; accord, Burrussv. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va.), aff'd
per curiam, 397 U.S. 44 (1970).
14. 293 F. Supp. at 331.

15. E.g., McDermott & Klein, The Cost-Quality Debate in School Finance Litigation: Do
Dollars Make a Difference?, 38 Law & Contemp. Prob. 415 (1974) (hereinafter cited as
Cost-Quality].
16. J. Coleman, Equality of Educational Opportunity (1966) [hereinafter cited as Coleman
Report]. The Coleman Report evolved from the Equality of Educational Opportunity Survey
(EEOS). This survey was undertaken in 1965 in accordance with a mandate from Congress to the
U.S. Office of Education to conduct a survey "concerning the lack of availability of equal
educational opportunities for individuals by reason of race, color, religion, or national origin in
public educational institutions ....
" Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 402, 78
Stat. 247. This study represented the "second largest social science research project in history."
On Equality of Educational Opportunity 5 (F.

Mosteller & D. Moynihan eds. 1972).
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minimum per pupil expenditure, no correlation exists between dollars spent
and student performance as measured by achievement scores in standardized
tests. 17 Critics of the report are quick to point out that this is not surprising
since there is debate as to whether standardized tests adequately measure that
which they purport to measure.' 8 The use of scores from standardized
achievement tests for measuring equality of education is known as the "output
standard."' 19
In addition to using outputs, courts, educators and commentators have
considered using the following as standards for measuring equality of educational opportunity: (1) equal dollars per pupil;20 (2) fiscal neutrality, 21 (3) a
24
23
22
and (5) minimum adequacy.
maximum variable ratio; (4) inputs;

The equal dollar per pupil standard measures equality of educational
opportunity in terms of dollars spent per pupil. Under this standard, equality
of educational opportunity exists when every pupil in the state receives the
same dollar expenditure for education. It should be noted that no court has as
yet adopted an equal dollar standard. In McInnis, the court pointed out that
equal dollar expenditures were not "the exclusive yardstick of a child's
educational needs.1 25 Courts in both California 26 and New Jersey2 7 also
17. Coleman Report, supra note 16, at 22, 325.
18. Cost-Quality, supra note 15, at 423-27. Standardized tests have been criticized on various
grounds including. (1) The educational goals measured are limited; (2) achievement tests do not
overlap very well with the objectives of the schools; (3) test designs are generally poor;, (4) there
are no assurances that the test measures that which it purports to measure. Id. at 424-26. See
generally Note, Legal Implications of the Use of Standardized Ability Tests in Employment and
Education, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 691 (1968); Note, The Legal Implications of Cultural Bias in the
Intelligence Testing of Disadvantaged School Children, 61 Geo. L.J. 1027 (1973); Note, Constitutional Requirements for Standardized Ability Tests Used in Education, 26 \'and. L. Rev. 789
(1973).
19. Cost-Quality, supra note 15, at 420. See also J. Burkhead, Public School Finance
Economics and Politics 76-78 (1964); R. Johns, K. Alexander & K. Jordan, Financing Education:
Fiscal and Legal Alternatives 436-38 (1972).
20. Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 335 (N.D. I1. 1968), aff'd per curiam sub norm.
McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 595, 487 P.2d 1241,
1248, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 608 (1971); A. Wise, Rich Schools Poor Schools: The Promise of Equal
Educational Opportunity 155 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Rich Schools Poor Schools]; CostQuality, supra note 15, at 417.
21. Coons, Introduction: "Fiscal Neutrality" After Rodriguez, 38 Law & Contemp. Prob. 299
(1974); Cost-Quality, supra note 15, at 418.
22. Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 844, 863-64 (D.D.C. 1971) (court decreed a remedy
using a maximum variable ratio test although not specifically designating it as such); Rich Schools
Poor Schools, supra note 20, at 156-57; Cost-Quality, supra note 15, at 418.
23. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 84 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Cost-Quality, supra note 15, at 419-20.
24. Cost-Quality, supra note 15, at 421-23.
25. 293 F. Supp. at 335.
26. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 595-96, 487 P.2d 1241, 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 609
(1971).
27. Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 520, 303 A.2d 273, 297-95, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976
(1973).
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explicitly rejected the equal dollar standard. Because legitimate differences in

expenditure often exist, for example, due to variations in the cost of living in
different localities or due to the special needs of the handicapped, requiring
equal dollars per pupil would not afford equal educational opportunity.28 The
rigidity of such a standard would not adequately provide for the needs of
minority students, which could be compensated for by increased expenditures. 29 For these reasons, an equal dollar per pupil standard for equality of
education is not likely to be acceptable to either the courts or to the reformers.
Another standard for equality of educational opportunity is fiscal neutrality. 30 Under this standard, equal educational opportunity would exist 3'
whenever "it]he quality of public education [is not] a function of wealth other
than the wealth of the state as a whole."'32 This standard implicitly assumes a
direct relationship between the amount spent for education and the quality of
the education obtained, since wealthier districts would no longer be able to
spend more for education (and thereby obtain a higher quality education),
than poorer districts simply because of greater property wealth. 33 What
makes this definition for equal educational opportunity all the more appealing
is that it creates a manageable judicial standard without the need to define
34
exactly what equality of educational opportunity is.
28. In Robinson v. Cahill, the New Jersey court stated that "[it] should not be understood to
mean that the State may not recognize differences in area costs, or a need for additional dollar
input to equip classes of disadvantaged children for the educational opportunity." Id.
29. In McInnis, the court noted that deprived students need preferential treatment, not equal
dollars. 293 F. Supp. at 335-36. The trial judge, in still another case, suggested that racial and
cultural differences could no longer be ignored and that there existed a need to give the
disadvantaged child special programs outside the regular school curriculum. Hobson v, Hansen,
269 F. Supp. 401, 471 (D.D.C. 1967), affd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir.
1969) (en banc). See also Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits of Constitutional
Jurisprudence Undefined, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 583, 591 (1968); Montoya, Bilingual-Bicultural
Education: Making Equal Educational Opportunities Available to National Origin Minority
Students, 61 Geo. L.J. 991 (1973).
30. The fiscal neutrality principle was made famous by Professors Coons, Clune and
Sugarman in their book Private Wealth and Public Education (1970). It was actually first
articulated by Harlan Updegraff of the University of Pennsylvania in 1921. "He was the first
theorist who proposed that wealth of the local school district be entirely eliminated as a factor
affecting the quality of a child's education." R. Johns, Some Critical Issues in School Financing,
in Constitutional Reform of School Finance 161 (K. Alexander & K. Jordan eds. 1973).
31. The California supreme court adopted fiscal neutrality as a standard in Serrano v. Priest,
5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
32. Private Wealth, supra note 2, at 2 (emphasis omitted).
33. The debate among educators and sociologists over whether increased educational expenditures necessarily lead to improved educational outputs (as measured by achievement on standardized tests) has never been resolved. As noted earlier, critics of the Coleman Report find fault with
the design of the achievement tests used. See notes 18 & 19 supra and accompanying text. Even
though the exact relationship between educational expenditures and the resultant quality of that
education is not known precisely, "[i]f money is inadequate to improve education, the residents of
poor districts should at least have an equal opportunity to be disappointed by its failure." Private
Wealth, supra note 2, at 30.
34. Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d
584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
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Fiscal neutrality appears to be an ideal standard. It permits variations in
educational expenditures only for reasons other than the wealth of the district.
One system of school financing which satisfies the fiscal neutrality standard is
district power equalizing (DPE). Under a DPE formula, 3" the amount of
expenditure per pupil is not a function of the wealth of the district in which
the student resides, but rather is a function of the rate of taxation for that
district. The state guarantees a specified expenditure per pupil based upon the
rate of taxation-the greater the rate, the greater the guarantee.3 6 Thus, a
district which is poor in property wealth and unable to raise the necessary
revenues for the per pupil expenditure specified under the DPE formula
would receive state funds sufficient to meet the level of expenditure per pupil
specified under the formula. Conversely, education revenues raised by wealthier districts in excess of that permitted by the formula would be recaptured by
the state for redistribution to poorer districts. 37 In this manner, variations in
educational expenditures which result from district property wealth disparities
are eliminated since the variations result only from differences in the rate of
taxation. Therefore, such a system is not dependent on wealth but is instead
fiscally neutral.
Critics argue that equality of educational opportunity could not exist under
a fiscal neutrality standard since variations in educational expenditures would
still be permitted.38 For example, under a DPE formula, owing to variations
in tax rates from one district to another, expenditure levels for education per
pupil would also vary. However, variations which still existed would no
longer be a function of the property wealth of the district, but would instead
be a function of the taxing effort exerted by the local community, a depen35. See Private Wealth, supra note 2, at 162-242 for a detailed explanation.
36. The mechanics of a DPE plan can be illustrated by the following hypothetical: the state
legislature enacted a school financing aid plan guaranteeing a per pupil expenditure according to
the table below:
Rate of Taxation
for Education

State Guaranteed
Expenditure Per Pupil

2.00%
3.00%

$1000
$1500

4.00%

$2000

(All rates in between those listed shall be proportioned
linearly.)
Suppose that School District A has an assessed property valuation of $40,000 per pupil while
District B has an assessed valuation of $70,000 per pupil. Assume further that both districts have
a property taxation rate of 2 percent for education. District A is able to raise only $800 per pupil
for education, while District B is able to raise $1400 per pupil. Since the legislature has
guaranteed $1000 per pupil for education for all districts taxing at the 2 percent rate, District A
will receive $200 in state aid while District B would not receive any and could even lose uls to
$400 to the state in the form of recapture if the state plan so requires. See note 37 infra and
accompanying text.
37. Private Wealth, supra note 2, at 162-242.
38. Colman, Financing Schools and Other Public Services, 4 Urban Law. 623, 635 (1972);

Cost-Quality, supra note 15, at 419; Richards, Equal Opportunity and School Financing:
Towards a Moral Theory of Constitutional Adjudication, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 32, 65-66 (1973).
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dence which is difficult to condemn. Conceptually at least, it seems only fair
to allow those who are willing to tax themselves at a higher rate a greater per
pupil expenditure than those taxing themselves at a lower rate. Under such a
system, a district can provide any level of expenditure specified in the state
plan simply by choosing the appropriate rate of taxation under the legislature's formula.
Equality of educational opportunity can also be gauged by the maximum
variable ratio standard. 3 9 Under this standard, equality of educational opportunity would exist as long as the maximum deviation for any given district
does not exceed a specified, albeit arbitrary, limit, such as plus or minus
twenty-five percent of the median per pupil expenditure in the state. 40 The
maximum variable ratio, by itself, does not do much to ensure equality of
educational opportunity. If the maximum variable ratio is set at zero percent,
it would be identical to an equal dollar standard. 4 1 If the ratio is set too high,
the resulting disparities in per pupil expenditure would be as serious as those
in existing financing systems which rely solely on ad valorem property
taxation. 4 2 When used in conjunction with existing DPE schemes, 43 however,

the concept of maximum variable ratio becomes a workable test for guaranteeing equal educational opportunities to all students in the state, regardless of
44
the wealth of the district wherein they reside.
Equality of educational opportunity can also be measured in terms of the
educational "inputs" that a student is given. This standard, suggested by
Justice Marshall in his dissent in Rodriguez,45 enables a court to consider the
physical facilities, teacher-student ratios, and teacher training, as well as
39. Rich Schools Poor Schools, supra note 20, at 143-59; Cost-Quality, supra note 15, at 418.
40. E.g., in Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1967), the district court ordered
that no expenditure could deviate by more than five percent from the mean per pupil expenditure

without adequate justification. Id. at 863-64. This decree was granted upon motion by the
plaintiffs for additional relief. Earlier, the public school system in the District of Columbia was

found to have unconstitutionally deprived Negro and poor children of their right to equal
educational opportunity. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom.
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc).
41. If no deviation from a median expenditure level is permitted, it is equivalent to requiring

all districts to spend an equal dollar amount per pupil where the dollar amount is set equally for all
students at the median level of expenditure in the state.
42. If the permissible deviation is very high, for example plus or minus 500 percent of the
median per pupil expenditure in the state, wealthy districts would be allowed to spend five times

as much for education as the median per pupil expenditure in the state, while poor districts would
be allowed to spend one-fifth as much as the median. Thus, the allowed variation from the lowest
to the highest would be 25 to 1.
43. See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 72.7030-.707'9 (Cum. Supp. 1974); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§§ 388.1101-.1279 (Supp. 1975); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 121.02-.22 (Supp. 1975). For an excellent
summary of legislative reform in the area see Grubb, The First Round of Legislative Reforms In
the Post-Serrano World, 38 Law & Contemp. Prob. 459 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Legislative
Reforms].
44. See notes 173 & 174 infra and accompanying text for a further explanation.
45. 411 U.S. at 84 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

SCHOOL FINANCING REFORM

19761

intangible factors 4in
determining whether equal educational opportunity exists
6
in a given state.
The majority in Rodriguez, however, preferred a minimum adequacy
standard rather than an input standard.4 7 According to the majority, as long
as every student in the state was provided with an education that met
minimum standards, no deprivation existed.4 8 Justice Marshall in his dissent
noted that the majority did not specify any guidelines for determining what
level of expenditure would be considered minimally adequate and therefore
constitutional. 4 9 What is minimally adequate for one child may be inadequate
for another, owing to the special needs of those who are physically handicapped or who are handicapped by reason of being minority students. The
standard offered by the majority in Rodriguez is no less unmanageable than
the standards which the majority purported to reject.5 0
Although there is controversy surrounding the relationship between the
amount of dollars spent and the quality of the education received when
measured by achievement on standardized tests, it is submitted that there is a
direct relationship between spending and the quality of education when
measured by the physical inputs given a child for education."' It is suggested
that society should not create artificial barriers to equality of educational
opportunity, and that existing systems of school financing based upon property wealth create just such an artificial barrier by granting a favored status
to students in rich districts. 5

M.

REVIEW OF MAJOR SCHOOL FINANCING

PLANS

Except for the state of Hawaii 3 which has a system of full state funding for
education,5 4 all existing state systems of financing education rely on local ad
46.

In Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), a precursor to Brown v. Board of Educ., 347

U.S. 483 (1954), the Supreme Court held that a black law school did not provide educational
opportunities equal to those provided at the University of Texas Law School. In its analysis, the
Court considered both tangible and intangible differences. With respect to the intangibles, the
Court considered "qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for
greatness in a law school." 339 U.S. at 634.
47. 411 U.S. at 37, 45.
48. Id. at 24.
49. Id. at 89 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
50. See id. at 54.
51. While increased spending does not necessarily lead to increased achievement on standardized achievement tests, increased spending presumably would lead to higher quality educational
inputs such as smaller classes, larger libraries and better laboratory facilities.
52. Students in wealthy districts are given a preferred status because of the regressive features
of the funding system, as shown in notes 158-63 infra and accompanying text.
53. Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 296-36 (1968).
54. Full state funding of education exists when the state provides all or nearly all of the
money needed to finance public education. The President's Commission on School Finance
recommended full state funding as an alternative to existing systems of school financing.
President's Commission on School Finance, Schools, People and Money: The Need for Educational Reform (1972); cf. Fleischmann Report, supra note 1, at 86. The most frequent objection to
full state funding is that local control would be emasculated. Many people believe, however, that
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valorem property taxation supplemented by various forms of state aid. The
state aid may, for example, be in the form of a fiat grant for each pupil in the
state regardless of the wealth of the school district in which he resides. Since
rich and poor districts alike receive the same amount of school aid, this
method does nothing to alleviate variations in expenditures per pupil among
the various school districts within the state.
Another commonly used form of state aid is the foundation plan."s Under
this plan, the state guarantees a minimum standard of education by giving the
local school district a grant dependent on the amount of money raised by the
local district. To qualify for the grant, a district must impose local taxes at a
specified minimum rate. The amount of money raised by that district will be
supplemented by state revenues to the extent necessary to ensure the
minimum expenditure per student set by the foundation plan in that particular state. 56 Although disparities may be lessened with a foundation plan of
state aid, such a plan cannot provide for equal educational opportunity since
57
there is nothing in the formula to eliminate fully any existing disparities.
The plan merely ensures a minimum level of education within the state.
One of the most widely discussed alternative plans for financing education
is district power equalizing. District power equalizing has been discussed
earlier in connection with fiscal neutrality.5 8 In the ideal situation, DPE
loss of local control is nothing more than a myth. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 129-30 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (local control called a sham);
Governor v. State Treasurer, 389 Mich. 1, 33, 203 N.W.2d 457, 471 (1972), vacated, 390 Mich.
389, 212 N.W.2d 711 (1973) (found local control to be a "hoax"); Fleischmann Report, supra note
1, at 86; Silard & Goldstein, Toward Abolition of Local Funding in Public Education, 3 J. Law &
Educ. 307, 332 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Silard & Goldstein]. The Fleischmann Commission
pointed out that in Great Britain local schools obtain most of their funds from the Central
Ministry, yet remain "fiercely independent." Fleischmann Report, supra note 1, at 87.
55. The foundation program, proposed almost fifty years ago, represents one of the last major
innovations in public school financing. Silard & Goldstein, supra note 54, at 307; see, e.g., Calif.
Educ. Code §§ 17301-18480 (West 1969), as amended, (West Supp. 1975).
56. Private Wealth, supra note 2, at 64. If, for example, the state legislature decided to ensure
a minimum foundation level of $800 per pupil for education, the state would provide funds
necessary to meet this level to qualifying school districts. To qualify under the plan, the state
usually requires some minimum rate of taxation. Thus, if the minimum qualifying school tax rate
were 1 percent and District A has $60,000 in assessed property valuation per pupil and exerts a
tax effort of 1 percent, it would qualify for state aid under the plan and would receive $200 from
the state per student since District A could raise only $600. See generally id. at 63-95.
57. New Jersey, at the time Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972),
aff'd, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973), was decided, had a
foundation type plan of state aid. Tractenberg, New Jersey, Robinson v. Cahill: The "Thorough
and Efficient" Clause, 38 Law & Contemp. Prob. 312, 314 n.22 (1974). The New Jersey supreme
court initially gave the legislature until December 31, 1974 to enact new legislation which would
be compatible with the court's mandate for financing education. Robinson v. Cahill, 63 N.J. 196,
306 A.2d 65 (1973). It has subsequently extended its allowance of the existing financing system
through the 1976-77 school year. Robinson v. Cahill, 67 N.J. 333, 339 A.2d 193 (1975). The New
Jersey legislature is currently wrestling with the problem. Robinson v. Cahill is discussed in detail
in notes 116-131 infra and accompanying text.
58. See notes 30-38 supra and accompanying text.
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produces the same per pupil expenditure for all districts having the same tax
rate. Unfortunately, in those states that have adopted a DPE plan, or some
modified form of it, the principal ingredient of recapture is all too often
missing.5 9 In fact, most states which have enacted DPE have also enacted
save-harmless clauses, so that wealthier districts would not receive less state
aid under DPE than they had previously received. 60 Since, in the absence of a
recapture provision, wealthier districts will still spend more per pupil for
education than less wealthy districts taxing at the same rate, most of the
existing 6DPE
plans are in reality nothing more than foundation plans in
1

disguise.

Of course, most state aid plans are not as simple as those described. Many
states combine features drawn from several plans.
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES LEADING TO

Rodriguez

The first major case won by education finance reformers was Serrano v.
Priest.62 Serrano was a class action brought by students and parents in

California seeking declaratory relief and an injunction against discrimination
in school financing. The California supreme court decided the case on both
federal and state constitutional grounds. 63 It found a violation of the equal
protection clauses of both the federal and state constitutions existed in that the
"system discriminates on the basis of the wealth of a district and its resi6S
dents." 64 Moreover, education was found to be a fundamental right.
59. Of the seven states analyzed in Legislative Reforms, supra note 43, only one state, Maine.
provided for recapture of funds which are in excess of that needed to provide the expenditure per
pupil guaranteed by the state for that given tax rate. Id. at 481. Maine has subsequently repealed
this provision. Law of June 22, 1973, ch. 556, § 1, [1973] Me. Laws 994 (repealed 1975).
60. E.g., Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 388.1121 (Supp. 1975); Wris. Stat. Ann. § 121.03(41(a)
(Supp. 1975). For example, if a district had received $200 per pupil in state aid prior to the
enactment of the DPE plan, under a save-harmless clause it would continue to receive $200 from
the state even though it would not be entitled to any aid under the DPE formula. Note that the
save-harmless clanse goes one step beyond the mere absence of recapture since the passage of
DPE is literally "harmless" to these districts.
61. A crucial difference does exist, however. Under a foundation plan of state aid, the state
guarantees just one minimum dollar amount for education per pupil while under a DPE plan
without recapture, there is a varying guarantee, one for each rate of taxation. See note 36 supra.
62.
5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
63. The court noted that two provisions of the California constitution were "substantially the
equivalent" to the federal equal protection clause. Id. at 596 n.ll, 487 P.2d at 1249 n.l1, 96 Cal.
Rptr. at 609 n.l1. The two provisions of the California constitution referred to by the court were
art. I, § 11 and art. I, § 21. For an analysis of the state issues see Karst, Serrano v. Priest: A State
Court's Responsibilities and Opportunities in the Development of Federal Constitutional Law, 60
Calif. L. Rev. 720 (1972).
64. 5 Cal. 3d at 604, 487 P.2d at 1255, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
65. Id. at 609, 487 P.2d at 1258, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618. The court cited Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). It is interesting to note that just two years after Serrano, the United
States Supreme Court, also citing Brown, reached exactly the opposite conclusion in Rodriguez.
411 U.S. at 29-39.
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From the time of the decision in Serrano, until the time the United States
Supreme Court decided San Antonio Independent School District v. Rod7
69
riguez,6 6 courts in Minnesota, 67 Texas, 68 New Jersey, Arizona, " Wyo71
72
73
ming,
Kansas,
and Michigan
reached the same conclusion as the
California court in Serrano. During that same period, only lower courts in
New York 74 and in Indiana 75 upheld their respective school financing statutes
as constitutional.
On March 21, 1973, the United States Supreme Court decided the case of
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez. 76 This decision has
been hailed as the "most important event in the history of American school
financing. '77 The action was brought by a group of parents from the
Edgewood Independent School District which had the highest ad valorem
property tax rate in the San Antonio metropolitan area, but was able to raise
7
only $26 per pupil for education in 1967-68. 8
In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision rejected the Serrano
rationale of fiscal neutrality, 79 refused to declare that education was a
"fundamental right"80 and refused to find a "suspect classification." 8' As a
result, the Court employed
the rational basis test in evaluating the Texas
82
school finance system.
66. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
67. Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971).
68. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971),
rev'd, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
69. Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972), aff'd, 62 N.J. 473, 303
A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
70. Hollins v. Shofstall, Civ. No. C-253652 (Ariz. Super. Ct., June 1, 1972), rev'd, 110 Ariz.
88, 515 P.2d 590 (1973).
71. Sweetwater County Planning Comm. v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234 (Wyo. 1971), jurls.
relinquished, 493 P.2d 1050 (Wyo. 1972).
72. Caldwell v. Kansas, Civ. No. 50616 (D. Kan., Aug. 30, 1972).
73. Governor v. State Treasurer, 389 Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d 457 (1972), vacated, 390 Mich.
389, 212 N.W.2d 711 (1973).
74. Spano v. Board of Educ., 68 Misc. 2d 804, 328 N.Y.S.2d 229 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
75. Jensen v. Board of Tax Comm'rs, 41 U.S.L.W. 2390 (Ind. Cir. Ct. 1973).
76. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). For a more detailed discussion of Rodriguez see generally Areen &
Ross, The Rodriguez Case: Judicial Oversight of School Finance, 1973 Sup. Ct. Rev. 33; The
Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 57, 105-16 (1973); Comment, San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez: A Retreat from Equal Protection, 22 Clev. St. L. Rev.
585 (1973); Note, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez: Inequitable But Not
Unequal Protection Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 27 Sw. L.J. 712 (1973).
77. Yudof & Morgan, Texas, Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District:
Gathering the Ayes of Texas-The Politics of School Finance Reform, 38 Law & Contemp. Prob.
383, 391 (1974).
78. 411 U.S. at 12.
79. Id.at 50-53.
80. Id. at 35.
81. Id.at 28.
82. In order to appreciate fully the significance of the Rodriguez decision, it is necessary to
understand the equal protection analysis used by the Court. The equal protection clause does not
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Probably the greatest setback to school finance reformers was the Court's
holding in Rodriguez that education was not a fundamental right for purposes
of equal protection analysis. 83 Justice Powell, speaking for the majority,
stated that
[e]ducation, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our
Federal Constitution. . . .As we have said, the undisputed importance of education
will not alone cause this Court to depart
from the usual standard for reviewing a
84
State's social and economic legislation.

Although it was claimed that there was a strong nexus between education and
other explicitly guaranteed constitutional rights such as free speech and
voting, the Court did not find this argument controlling.8"
In addition to holding that education was not a fundamental right, the
deny the states the right to set up classifications. It requires only that the classifications be
reasonable; that is, it requires that the class chosen be differentiated by common characteristics
and that there be a rational relation between the classification and the purpose of the law. E.g.,
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
There are two situations where the mere showing that a classification is rationally related to a
legitimate state purpose is insufficient to sustain the classification. The first is where the
classification impinges upon a fundamental right. In such a case, the classification must be
justified by a "compelling" state interest. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). The
second situation in which a mere showing of a rational relationship is not a sufficient justification
is when a "suspect classification" is involved. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)
(aliens). When neither of these two situations is present, the classification is presumed to be valid,
and the state need show only that some rational relationship exists between the state objective
and the classification that is the subject of the challenge. San Antonio Independent School Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 72-73 (1972); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 465-66 (1957); Williamson
v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 490-91 (1955); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S.
61, 78 (1911). See also B. Schwartz, Constitutional Law 285-322 (1972).
83. 411 U.S. at 35-37.
84. Id. at 35.
85. Id. at 35-36. In Rodriguez, plaintiffs argued that freedom of speech would be a
meaningless guarantee unless the speaker were able to articulate his thoughts intelligently and
persuasively. Also it would not be possible to make effective use of the right to vote unless there
existed an informed electorate. The Supreme Court, however, replied that although it has been
zealous in the protection of these rights, it has never presumed the authority or the ability to
guarantee the "most effective speech or the most informed electoral choice." Id. at 36 (emphasis
omitted). A great number of school finance reformers believe that had education been deemed a
fundamental right by the Supreme Court, many of the existing school district classifications
would not be able to withstand application of the compelling interest test. The Rodriguez Court
agreed with the court in Serrano that school finance systems such as those in California and Texas
"will not pass muster" under a "strict scrutiny" standard of review. Id. at 16-17. Since the Court
applied the less stringent rational basis test, however, it found the Texas system constitutional.
Justice Powell wrote that "[tihe need is apparent for reform in tax systems which may well have
relied too long and too heavily on the local property tax." Id. at 58. Justice Stewart, concurring,
added that "[tihe method of financing public schools in Texas, as in almost every other State, has
resulted in a system of public education that can fairly be described as chaotic and unjust." Id. at
59 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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8 6
Court found that classification by district property wealth was not suspect.
The Court stated that it could not find a discernible class of poor who had
been discriminated against. Moreover, even if such a class were identifiable,
there would
be no equal protection violation since the deprivation was not
87
absolute.
In Rodriguez, Justice White in dissent opined that the parents and children
in the Edgewood school district had suffered invidious discrimination in
violation of the equal protection clause. 88 In his view, the class consisted of
parents and children in Edgewood and other similarly situated school districts
where the tax base was sufficiently small as to make comparable per pupil
expenditure for education impossible.8 9
Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion9" is especially noteworthy, because "it
represents the first explicit adoption by a member of the Court" of an
alternative to the two-tier approach for equal protection analysis currently
subscribed to by the majority. 91 Justice Marshall objected to the majority's
attempt "to establish today that equal protection cases fall into one of two
neat categories which dictate the appropriate standard of review-strict
scrutiny or mere rationality. '92 He offered a sliding scale test for equal
protection analysis.
Whether the Court will adopt a sliding scale standard for equal protection,
or conclude someday that education is a fundamental right, would be mere
speculation. It is evident in either case, however, that Justice Marshall's
dissent has set the theoretical groundwork on which to build anew in the
areas of both equality of educational financing and equal educational opportunity.

V. REFORM THROUGH THE STATE COURTS
Much of the early school finance litigation alleged a violation of both state
and federal constitutions. 93 Since Rodriguez has apparently signaled the
demise of the federal equal protection clause 94 as a vehicle for reform, this
86. Id. at 28.
87. Id. at 25. The Court's distinction between absolute and relative deprivation has been the
focal point of criticism. Coons, Introduction: "Fiscal Neutrality" After Rodriguez, 38 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 299, 304 (1974).
88. 411 U.S. 1, 68 (White, J., dissenting).

89. Id. at 69.
90. Id. at 70 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
91. Roos, The Potential Impact of Rodriguez on Other School Reform Litigation, 38 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 566, 569 (1974). This alternative approach was proposed by Professor Gerald
Gunther. Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for
a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 20-37 (1972). See also Comment, Equal
Protection in Transition: An Analysis and a Proposal, 41 Fordham L. Rev. 605 (1973).
92. 411 U.S. at 98 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
93. E.g., Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); Robinson
v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
94. The Supreme Court in Rodriguez left open the possibility that an absolute deprivation of
education might be a violation of the federal equal protection clause. It may also be a violation of
the equal protection clause where the class discriminated against is readily identifiable or where It
can be shown that present inequities result from a history of deliberate economic segregation or
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Comment will consider various legal approaches that are still open to finance
reformers.
Although the Supreme Court in Rodriguez did not find a violation of the
federal equal protection clause, a school financing system such as that
challenged in Rodriguez, may nonetheless violate a state's own equal protection dause. Where, as in Serrano, an independent state ground exists for
declaring a state statute unconstitutional, a pronouncement by the United
States Supreme Court that the statute did not violate the federal equal
protection clause would not have any effect on the unconstitutionality of the
state statute. 95 Since all but four states have an equal protection clause in
their constitutions, 96 reform through the use of a state equal protection clause
is still a viable method of legal attack.
In addition to Serrano, challenges to existing systems of school financing as
violating a state equal protection clause have been made in various cases
including Governor v. State Treasurer9 7 and Shofstali v. Hollins.9
In Governor v. State Treasurer, the Supreme Court of Michigan held that
the primary issue was one of equality of educational support. 99 It reasoned
that the state constitution 0 0 made education a fundamental right.' 01 This,
taken together with the state's equal protection clause, required that all school
districts be provided with equal financial support and maintenance.10 2 As
measured by this guideline, the court
found the system which existed at the
10 3
time of the suit unconstitutional.
Implicit in the court's analysis was the adoption of an input standard for
gauging equality of educational opportunity. justice Marshall espoused a
similar standard in his dissent in Rodriguez.1 0 4 Under such a standard, the
issue is then what resources are provided for the children's education, rather
than what the children are able to do with them.' 0 s This appears to be a
other purposeful discrimination. 411 U.S. 1, 25, 37. For a discussion of the type of cases which
might fit within these categories see Tractenberg, Reforming School Finance Through State
Constitutions: Robinson v. Cahill Points the Way, 27 Rutgers L. Rev. 365, 382-44 (1974).
95. C. Wright, Federal Courts § 107, at 482 (2d ed. 1970). This is true because the state's
highest court speaks with final authority on what is unconstitutional under state law. See, e.g.,
Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 210 (1960); American Ry. Express Co. v. Kentucky, 273
U.S. 269, 272 (1927); Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 818, 537 P.2d 635, 660 (1975)
(Donaldson, J., dissenting).
96. The states of Colorado, Delaware, Mississippi and Montana do not have equal protection
clauses in their constitutions.
97. The case is entitled Governor v. State Treasurer in the official report but Milliken v.
Green in the unofficial and in the court records. 389 Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d 457 (1972), vacated,
390 Mich. 389, 212 N.W.2d 711 (1973).
98. 110 Ariz. 88, 515 P.2d 590 (1973).
99. 389 Mich. at 11-12, 203 N.W.2d at 460.
100. Mich. Const. art. VIII, § 2.
101. 389 Mich. at 25-28, 203 N.W.2d at 468-69.
102. Id. at 11-12, 203 N.W.2d at 460-61.
103. Id. at 37-38, 203 N.W.2d at 473-74.
104. 411 U.S. at 84 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
105. Id.
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0 6
better approach than applying an output standard, since the controversy'
over the exact relationship between dollars spent and quality of the resultant
education is circumvented.
Since the Michigan supreme court based its decision on an interpretation of
state constitutional requirements only, the conclusion that the financing
system was unconstitutional could withstand a contrary holding, founded on
10 7
federal constitutional mandates, by the United States Supreme Court.
Almost a year after its original decision, however, the Michigan supreme
court concluded that the case should never have been heard, and consequently dismissed the complaint and vacated the earlier decision. 108 Apparently the court felt that the Michigan legislature had moved sufficiently fast
towards reforming the financing statutes in the state and that the case had
become moot. 10 9
In the Shofstall"° case, taxpayers and students in Arizona brought suit
alleging that the state system of financing public education violated both the
state and federal equal protection clauses. The trial court had granted
summary judgment to the plaintiff taxpayers on the ground that the system of
school financing in Arizona invidiously discriminated against them.I' The
Arizona supreme court reversed, holding that although the state constitution

did guarantee a basic right to education, any system of education would meet
the requirement, provided it was "rational, reasonable and neither discriminatory nor capricious.""? The court then went on to find the Arizona
system constitutional. The court accepted Justice Powell's argument 1 3 from
Rodriguez that if property taxation were unconstitutional for financing education, it would likewise be unconstitutional for financing other essential
106. See notes 15-19 supra and accompanying text.
107. See note 95 supra and accompanying text. The court ruled that in the state of Michigan,
education was a fundamental right. 389 Mich. at 25-28, 203 N.W.2d at 468-69.
108. The case was presented to the Michigan supreme court on certification by the lower
court. Michigan court rules give the supreme court discretion to permit a lower court to certify a
question for appeal on the motion of the governor of the state. Mich. Gen. Ct. R. 797. The court
therefore was able to decide that the question should not have been certified. This decision tins
been criticized because there is no discretion to deny the governor the opportunity to seek
declaratory relief in the trial court and, if unsuccessful, to appeal to the state supreme court in the
usual fashion. Mich. Const. art. V, § 8; Mich. Gen. Ct. R. 521. Thus, the proper disposition
would appear to be a remand of the case to the trial court and not a dismissal of the entire case.
Hain, Michigan: Milliken v. Green: Breaking the Legislative Deadlock, 38 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 350, 359 (1974).
109. 390 Mich. 389, 212 N.W.2d 711 (1973). Although the case had become moot, the court
did not say so explicitly. The concurring opinions also only implied that the case was moot by
pointing out changed circumstances. Id. at 389 n.1, 401-02, 212 N.W.2d at 711 n.1, 717-18. The
Michigan legislature had reformed the state school*financing system by enacting a form of district
power equalizing. See generally Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 388.1101-.1279 (Supp. 1975).
110. 110 Ariz. 88, 515 P.2d 590 (1973).
111. Id. at 89, 515 P.2d at 591.
112. Id. at 90, 515 P.2d at 592.
113. Id. at 91, 515 P.2d at 593.
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services.11 4 Implicit in this argument is the assumption that local property
taxation, even with its detrimental effect on education, cannot be condemned
as unconstitutional for financing education, without also condemning it as
unconstitutional for financing all other essential services such as fire and
police protection. No effort was made, however, to distinguish between
education and other essential services. It is submitted that a very fundamental
distinction exists, not so much in the nature of the importance of the services
compared, but in their availability. For example, disparities in funding may
cause one fire department to be less efficient than another. In an emergency,
however, assistance can be obtained from nearby communities. On the other
hand, a child who is receiving an inferior education has no recourse and
cannot invite himself to attend classes in another school district.
As in Shofstall, most state courts are generally reluctant to expand the
meaning of their state equal protection clauses beyond the interpretation
which the United States Supreme Court is willing to give to the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Still another avenue remains,
however, for an attack on present school finance inequities-the education
clauses of specific state constitutions." 5
VI.

LITIGATION THROUGH A STATE EDUCATION CLAUSE

Two weeks after the United States Supreme Court decided Rodriguez, the
New Jersey supreme court handed down its decision in Robinson v. Cahill. 116
In Robinson, plaintiffs argued that the equal protection clauses of both the
United States and New Jersey constitutions prohibited the state from dis114. 411 U.S. 1, 54. "[If local taxation for local expenditures were an unconstitutional
method of providing for education then it might be an equally impermissible means of providing
other necessary services .... " Id.
115. Nearly all states have provisions in their state constitutions regarding public education.
For example, some state constitutions mandate a "thorough and efficient" system of public
schools. Md. Const. art. VIII, § 1; Minn. Const. art. VIII, § 3; N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 4; Ohio
Const. art. VI, § 2; Pa. Const. art- III, § 14; S.D. Const. art. VIII, § 15; W. Va. Coast.
art. XII, § 1; Wyo. Const. art. VII, § 9. Some state constitutions mandate a "general
and uniform" system of public schools. Ariz. Cost. art. XI, § 1; Idaho Const. art.
IX, § 1; Ind. Cost. art. VIII, § 1; N.C. Const. art. IX, § 2; Ore. Const. art. VIII, § 3;
Wash. Coast. art. IX, § 2. Other state constitutions mandate a "uniform" system of
public education. Colo. Const. art. IX, § 2; Fla. Cost. art. IX, § 1; Nev. Cost. art.
XI, § 2; N.M. Const. art. XII, § 1; N.D. Cost. art. VIII, § 148; Utah Const. art. X, § 1;
Wis. Const. art. X, § 3. Still other states have provisions in their state constitutions
mandating that the state provide an "efficient" system of public instruction. Ark.
Const. art. XIV, § 1; Del. Coast. art. X, § 1; Ky. Const. § 183; Tex. Const. art. VII, § 1.
Arkansas and Delaware, in addition to requiring efficiency, mandate that the system of public
education be "general." Ark. Const. art. XIV, § 1; Del. Const. art. X, § 1. While there are other
state constitutional provisions relating to education, the above examples have been chosen
because of the existence of key phrases such' as "thorough and efficient" and "general and
uniform." See Tractenberg, Reforming School Finance Through State Constitutions: Robinson v.
Cahill Points the Way, 27 Rutgers L. Rev. 365 (1974).
116. 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
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criminating in favor of children living in wealthy districts.1 17 Plaintiffs also
alleged that the "thorough and efficient" ' 8 clause of the New Jersey constitution required the state to provide each and every child in the state with equal
educational opportunity." 9 On the basis of evidence showing substantial
fiscal disparities among New Jersey's 600 school districts, as well as evidence
showing a direct relationship between property wealth and per pupil expenditures, the trial court concluded that disparities in per pupil spending had an
adverse effect on the quality of education provided to children living in poor
districts. 120 Hence, there was a violation of the equal protection clauses of
both the federal and state constitutions.' 2 1 On appeal, the state supreme court
rejected the lower court's equal protection argument.
In a unanimous decision, the New Jersey supreme court accepted the trial
court's finding of fact that the "disparity in the number of dollars 122spent per
pupil" was based upon residency in the various school districts.

While acknowledging that "[c]onceivably a State Constitution could be
more demanding"' 23 than the federal equal protection clause, the court
declined the invitation to give to the New Jersey equal protection clause a
meaning not contained in the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
24
amendment.'
Classification by wealth was specifically deemed not to be
"suspect"' 25 and education was found not to be a fundamental right in New
117. 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972), modified and aff'd, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d
273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
118. The New Jersey constitution reads: "The Legislature shall provide for the maintenance
and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all the
children in the State between the ages of five and eighteen years." N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 4, V 1.
119. Complaint at Second Count 1 3 & 5, at 18, as quoted from Tractenberg, New Jersey:
Robinson v. Cahill: The "Thorough and Efficient" Clause, 38 Law & Contemp. Prob. 312, 314-15
(1974).
120. 118 N.J. Super. 223, 280, 287 A.2d 187, 217 (1972).
121. Id.
122. 62 N.J. at 481, 303 A.2d at 276. The court found it evident "that State aid does not
operate substantially to equalize the sums available per pupil." Id. It noted also that "the quality
of educational opportunity does depend in substantial measure upon the number of dollars
invested," although no explanation was offered as to how such a conclusion was reached. Id., 303
A.2d at 277. At the time the original complaint was filed, the New Jersey financing statute, N.J.
Stat. Ann. §§ 18A:58-1 to 58-18.1 (Supp. 1975), provided for a traditional foundation plan. Under
the New Jersey plan as it existed, for each school district that raised its fair share of tax dollars,
the state guaranteed a minimum foundation level, by providing the difference between that level
and the amount actually raised. See note 57 supra for the present status of this plan.
123. 62 N.J. at 490, 303 A.2d at 282.
124. See id. at 492, 500-01, 303 A.2d at 283, 287. The court refused to decide Robinson on
the basis of the state's equal protection clause largely because it felt that such a decision would
require a rigid solution as a remedy. Considering the argument given by Justice Powell in
Rodriguez, it perceived difficulty in separating education from other essential services. Id. at 492,
303 A.2d at 283. The court stated that, while nothing could be more fundamental than food and
shelter, there were still varying levels of welfare assistance in New Jersey. Id. at 495, 303 A.2d at
284.
125. Id. at 492, 303 A.2d at 283.
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Although the court concluded that the New Jersey constitution' 2 7
Jersey.
did not require that all taxpayers be treated equally, it did find that the
"thorough and efficient" 128 clause warranted that all students be given equal
educational opportunity. 29 In measuring whether there was equal educational opportunity, the court adopted the dollar input standard and found that
the constitutional mandate was not met. 130 It pointed out that under the
dollar input standard, the existing system of school financing in New Jersey
could not satisfy the constitutional mandate unless the lowest per pupil
expenditure existing in the state was itself within that requirement. Rather
than declare what the specific monetary requirement was under the state
constitution, the court said only that the constitution's "thorough and
efficient" clause guaranteed to every school age child an educational opportunity "which is needed in the contemporary setting to equip a child for his
' 31
role as a citizen and as a competitor in the labor market." '
The decision in Robinson has paved the way for a new approach to the
financing of education. As an alternative to an equal protection attack,
Robinson has shown that existing school financing systems may be condemned as violative of a state constitution's education clause. Other court
challenges based upon an alleged violation of a state's education clause have
32
and Washington. 133
been brought in both Idaho
34
In Thompson v. Engelking,1 the Idaho supreme court reversed a lower
court finding that the Idaho system for financing education violated the state
constitution. The lower court noted that the constitution mandated that the
state provide and maintain a uniform system of public schools.' 35 Although
126

126. Id. at 494, 303 A.2d at 284.
127. N.J. Const art. VIII, § 1,
1(a).
128. Id. § 4,
1.
129. The court stated that it did not doubt that equal educational opportunity for all children
was precisely in the minds of the framers of the state constitution. Furthermore, the mandate that
there be maintained a "thorough and efficient" system of free public schools could have "no other
import." 62 N.J. at 513, 303 A.2d at 294.

130. The court used the dollar input criterion because it was "plainly relevant" and because it
had been shown "no other viable criterion for measuring compliance with the constitutional
mandate." Id. at 515-16, 303 A.2d at 295.
131. Id. at 515, 303 A.2d at 295. In tying the constitutional requirement to competition in the
labor market, the court indirectly showed an awareness that school financing inequities result in
many other socioeconomic inequities. Professor Coons and his colleagues warned the reformers of
school financing not to treat school finance reform "as an outrider of the racial problems." Coons,
Clune & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity. A Workable Constitutional Test for State Financial Structures, 57 Calif. L. Rev. 305, 355 (1969). But a nexus does exist since "racially separate
schools inhibit elimination of school inequality, and unequal schools retard eradication of school
segregation.... [H]ousing restrictions [are defended] by the argument that low-cost housing will
mean an influx of poor families, which will cause a reduced tax base for the operation of their
schools. In this way, one social injustice is made the excuse for another .
Silard & Goldstein,
supra note 54, at 324-25.
132. Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 537 P.2d 635 (1975).
133. Northshore School Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 84 Wash. 2d 685, 530 P.2d 178 (1974).
134. 96 Idaho 793, 537 P.2d 635 (1975).
135. Id. at 795, 537 P.2d at 637. The Idaho constitution requires that the legislature "establish
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acknowledging that the legislature had a constitutional duty to establish and
maintain a system of public schools, the court felt that the enactment of a
foundation plan by the state sufficiently satisfied that constitutional man6
date.

13

The court rejected the notion that equality of education required equal
dollar expenditure per pupil. 137 As pointed out in this Comment, 138 the equal
dollar standard is not only not exclusive, but also has not been accepted by
any court to date. 139 By failing to perceive and consider that other standards
exist to gauge equality of educational opportunity, the court did a disservice
both to itself and to the school children in Idaho.140 In spite of the Idaho
constitution's mandate,14 1 the court's only concession was that, even if the
constitution required equality of education, it did not demand equal dollar
expenditure. 142 The question of whether equal educational opportunity itself
was actually mandated by the education clause of the Idaho constitution was
never resolved by the court. It was with this failure that the dissent took
issue.
The problem, as the dissent perceived, rested not in the disparities in
educational expenditure alone, but instead with the variations in the ability to
raise revenues for education owing to wide disparities in district property
wealth. 143 The dissent criticized the majority opinion for declaring on the one
hand that it was the duty of the legislature to fund at least a part of the school
system, and stating on the other hand that existing funding levels were
somehow adequate without saying exactly why. To the dissent, the mandate
of the constitution was clear. Although equal dollars per pupil were not
required, the constitution did require the state to provide a system of
education that was substantially free from dependence upon variable property
wealth. 144 To the dissent it was clear that a general and uniform system is one
which is fiscally neutral, not one which requires equal dollars per pupil. 145 It
is submitted that the dissent's reasoning is more persuasive. A general,
uniform and thorough system of education is not necessarily one that requires
and maintain a general, uniform and thorough system of public, free common schools." Idaho
Const. art. IX, § 1.
136. 96 Idaho at 810-11, 537 P.2d at 652-53. Contra, Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487
P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d at 273, cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973). These two cases are discussed at notes 62-65 & 116-31 supra and
accompanying text.
137. 96 Idaho at 799-800, 537 P.2d at 641-42. Both the courts in California and New Jersey
likewise rejected the notion that equal dollar expenditure was required for equality of educational
opportunity.
138. See notes 13-49 supra and accompanying text.
139. See notes 25-28 supra and accompanying text.
140. As pointed out in notes 13-49 supra and accompanying text, many other standards for
gauging equality of educational opportunity exist.
141. Idaho Const. art. IX, § 1.
142. 96 Idaho at 799-800, 537 P.2d at 641-42.
143. Id. at 827-28, 537 P.2d at 669-70 (Donaldson, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 828, 537 P.2d at 670.
145. Id. at 827, 537 P.2d at 669.
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equal dollars per pupil, but it must be one which does not have any inherent
biases favoring one group over another. Disparities in taxable property wealth
is just such a bias. Under fiscal neutrality, educational expenditures may vary
for any reason other than the wealth of the school district. It is further
submitted that a general, uniform and thorough system of education would
exist under fiscal neutrality.
Another recent case decided under a state constitution's education clause
was Northshore School District No. 417 v. Kinnear.146 The issue in Kinnear
was the same as that in Thompson, that is, whether the state had fully met its
constitutional responsibility of providing a "general and uniform system of
public schools. '1 47 A majority of the Washington supreme court could agree
only that plaintiffs had failed to prove their case. 148 Two of the majority
justices, in a separate opinion, explicitly refused to concur in the part of the
majority opinion which suggested that the state was currently providing
ample education for all students. 149 Because only three justices explicitly
found the existing system of funding education to be constitutional and
because the author of the majority opinion has since retired from the bench, it
is possible that future cases in Washington will be decided in accordance with
the dissent's finding that the existing system of financing education is unconstitutional.150 Washington is the only state whose constitution speaks of
education as a "paramount duty." 1'5 Since the eventual outcome of litigation
in the state of Washington in the area of educational financing will undoubtedly have an impact on similar court challenges in other states having
education clauses less forcefully drafted, it becomes important to consider the
analysis given by the Kinnear dissent.
The dissent emphasized that the Washington constitution placed an absolute duty on the state alone to provide ample provision for the education of all
school age children within the state. 5 2 This duty was deemed dominant
above all other duties of the state since it was the only duty made
"paramount" by the state constitution. IS3 Not only did the constitution impose
"upon the State a 'paramount duty.. . to make ample provision ... ' but it
146.
147.

84 Wash. 2d 685, 530 P.2d 178 (1974).
Wash. Const. art. IX, § 2. Five separate opinions were filed. 84 Wash. 2d 685, 530 P.2d

178 (1974).
148. 84 Wash. 2d at 729, 530 P.2d at 203.
149. Id. at 730-31, 530 P.2d at 203-04 (Rosellini, J., concurring). Justice Wright concurred
with Justice Rosellini. The concurring justices noted that "[we] do not, however, concur in those
portions of the opinion which would seem to suggest that the State is now providing 'ample'
education for all students. There is too much public opinion to the contrary and too many facts of
which the members of this court are inescapably aware to justify such a conclusion." Id. at 730,
530 P.2d at 203.
150. Morris & Andrews, Ample Provision for Washington's Common Schools: Northshore's
Constitutional Promises to Keep, 10 Gonzaga L. Rev. 19, 28 (1974).
151. The Washington constitution reads: "It is the paramount duty of the state to make ample
provision for the education of all children residing within its borders, without distinction or
preference on account of race, color, caste, or sex." Wash. Const. art. IX, § 1.
152. See 84 Wash. 2d at 755, 530 P.2d at 215-16 (Stafford, J.,dissenting).
153. Id. at 754-56, 530 P.2d at 215-16.
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requires that the goal be achieved 'without distinction or preference on
account of race, color, caste, or sex.' "1154 The dissent concluded that the
constitution assured to every school age child in the state an education
unaffected by cultural heritage or wealth.' 5
Because of the paramount duty of the state, the education clause was
deemed to provide an independent guarantee of equal protection, in addition
to whatever guarantees were provided by the state's equal protection
clause.' 5 6 The importance of this conclusion lies in the implication that,
perhaps because of the greater guarantee, the state could not justify the
disparities in educational expenditures resulting from the present school
financing system, even if the state were able to show that "a compelling
57
interest" existed.
VII.

CONCLUSIONS AND A PROPOSAL

Because of the present practice of financing education predominantly
through ad valorem property taxes, a school district located in an area which
is relatively poor in property wealth must levy a tax at a rate considerably
higher than must a wealthy district in order to raise the same amount of
school dollars. Since one cannot justify different educational needs of children
on the basis of the wealth of the district in which they reside, it is difficult to
justify the variations in the level of educational services which result from tax
base disparities. The present system of school financing is unfair to children
living in poor districts since the tax base from which educational resources
can be raised is severely limited.'15 To make matters worse, most states have
limitations on the maximum tax rate which may be levied for financing
education. 159 Thus, because of the tax limits imposed, people living in less
wealthy districts very often could not spend as much per child even if they
were willing to accept an onerous rate of taxation. 160 The most regressive
Id. at 755-56, 530 P.2d at 216 (footnote omitted).
155. Id. at 756, 530 P.2d at 216-17.
156. Id., 530 P.2d at 217.
157. In Kinnear, the dissent characterized the majority decision as "a legal pygmy of doubtful
origin" that "cannot withstand a critical analysis either factually or legally," and whose "comfortable 'solution' may be short-lived." Id. at 732, 530 P.2d at 204 (Stafford, J., dissenting).
158. The practice of financing education through ad valorem property taxation hurts those
with fixed income the most. E.g., Report of the Citizens Union Committee on Education
Finance, Financing Public Education in New York State: An Analysis of the Fleischmann
Commission Report, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 6, 7-9 (1973).
159. A majority of states have maximums on the rates of taxation for financing education.
Harrison, What Now After San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez?: Electoral
Inequality and the Public School Finance Systems in California and Texas, 5 Rutgers-Camden
L.J. 191, 194 (1974); e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 52:27BB-92 to -93 (1955); Texas Educ. Code Ann.
§ 20.04 (1972).
160. In addition to tax ceilings, some states even have laws prohibiting the use of nonproperty taxation for school financing. Harrison, What Now After San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez?: Electoral Inequality and the Public School Finance Systems in
California and Texas, 5 Rutgers-Camden L.J. 191, 196 (1974).
154.
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feature of local property taxation, however, is the fact that the total amount
of taxes paid is deductible against taxable income for purposes of federal
income taxation. 16 1 Because the federal income tax structure is graduated,
people in higher income brackets receive a greater benefit from a tax deduc162
tion than those in lower income brackets.
Since property taxes are usually imposed at the local level, children residing
in areas that are heavily populated by retired citizens may often be
shortchanged. 1 63 Furthermore, because the available tax revenues cannot be
ascertained far in advance, planning for the educational needs of the children
in a school district is often impossible.
The substantial inequities which existed in the financing of elementary and
secondary education brought about pressure for reform in the early 1900's.1 64
It was not until the late 1960's, however, that the use of court litigation
1 65
became widespread.
Since the California supreme court's pronouncement in Serrano, school
finance reform has vacillated between success and failure. The refusal by
courts to overturn patently inequitable financing legislation on the ground
that equal educational opportunity is too nebulous a concept for the judiciary
is unfortunate, since a standard can always be found which is both equitable
and manageable. This Comment has described six of the many different
standards available for gauging equality of educational opportunity.1 66 As
noted, equality of educational opportunity can be measured in terms of inputs
or in terms of outputs. It can also be measured in terms of the maximum
161. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 164.
162. B. Bittker & L. Stone, Federal Income Estate and Gift Taxation 190 (4th ed. 1972). For
example, a person who is in the seventy percent marginal tax bracket actually ends up paying
only thirty percent of every dollar paid for property taxes since he is allowed a deduction for an
amount which, if taxed, would have been taxed at seventy percent. This is in contrast to someone
in the twenty-five percent marginal tax bracket who actually ends up paying seventy-five percent
of every dollar paid for property taxes. In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court pointed out that the few

wealthiest districts in Texas have the highest median family income and spend the most on
education, and that the several poorest districts have the lowest income and spend the least on
education. For the remaining districts, however, no direct correlation exists between family
income and educational expenditure. 411 U.S. at 26-27.
163. See Silard & Goldstein, supra note 54, at 317-18. Since retired citizens most likely do not
have school age children, they are less likely to vote for increased school spending. Id. It is, of
course, possible that in an area heavily populated by retired citizens, there will be a relatively
small number of school age children. In such a situation, per pupil expenditure could be high.
164. R_ Johns, Some Critical Issues in School Financing, in Constitutional Reform of School
Finance 160 (K Alexander & K. Jordan eds. 1973).
165. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D.
Tex. 1971), rev'd, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. il. 1968), affd
per curiam sub nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Stipp.
401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc);
Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); Governor v. State
Treasurer, 389 Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d 457 (1972), vacated, 390 Mich. 389, 212 N.W.Zd 711 (1973);
Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
166. See notes 13-49 supra and accompanying text.
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allowable deviation from a median per pupil expenditure for education in a
particular state. This standard is called the maximum variable ratio standard.
Other standards discussed in this Comment included fiscal neutrality, equal
dollars per pupil and minimum adequacy. Under fiscal neutrality, equality of
educational opportunity would exist whenever the variations in per pupil
expenditure
for education are not the result of wealth differences in school
167
districts.
The Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez did not completely rule out the
possibility that present education financing laws could be violative of the
federal equal protection clause. The Court merely found that there was no
absolute deprivation in the Texas system and that the class discriminated
against in Rodriguez was not readily identifiable. 168 Even had the Court ruled
out the federal equal protection clause as an instrument for education financing reform, the Court's decision would not preclude a finding by a state court
that a violation of a state equal protection clause existed. Moreover, challenges may be made in state courts based on specific education clauses such
as
170
69
or -the "uniform and general" clauses.
the "thorough and efficient"'
A more. expeditious approach may be to persuade the individual state
legislatures of the need for reform. Much activity in the form of legislative
reform did take place in the early 1970's, spurred in part by court challenges.
A large number of the reforms enacted were variations of the district power
equalizer (DPE) type. 171 Most of these enactments,, however, were without a
recapture clause and, in fact, usually contained a save-harmless clause 17 2 so
that wealthier districts would not receive any less state aid than they did prior
to the new legislation. It has been said that "[tihe inclusion of save-harmless
clauses, [as well as the deletion of a recapture provision] reflects both political
necessity and a justifiable desire to minimize the disruption of the transition
to a new financing system.' 7 3 It is submitted that equal educational opportunity can exist despite the presence of political necessities. Any DPE formula
without a provision for full recapture does very little to equalize educational
opportunities since the pre-existing disparities in per pupil expenditures could
not be eliminated without recapture. Because the realities of political necessity
will often preclude the enactment of full recapture, it is suggested that the
recapture provision be tied into a maximum variance ratio formula. Under
such a system of DPE, each district will still be guaranteed an equal sum per
pupil for a given tax rate. Unlike a true DPE formula, there is no complete
recapture initially owing to political necessities. Unlike most of the existing
DPE plans, some recapture would take place, but only if the total per pupil
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

See notes 30-38 supra and accompanying text.
See note 87 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 116-31 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 134-57 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 43 & 58-61 supra and accompanying text.
See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
Legislative Reforms, supra note 43, at 467.
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expenditure for a given district exceeded a maximum variance allowed by the
174
state.
In tying recapture to a maximum variable ratio, it would be politically
expedient to set the initial ratio rather high; then wealthy districts would not
lose much education revenue due to recapture. In order to achieve convergence, however, reformers will have to insist that, as part of this solution,
the legislature provide that the maximum allowable variable ratio approach
one over a finite period of time. True fiscal neutrality would result as the ratio
reaches one, since all revenue raised in excess of that allowed by the DPE
plan would be recaptured by the state. In this manner, disruption of the
existing system of school financing will be kept to a minimum. Over a period
of time, true convergence would result and a new level of educational
opportunity would be achieved.

Edward G.H. Chin
174. For example, if the state were to guarantee $900 per pupil for all districts taxing at the
rate of $2.56, any district taxing at that same rate and raising more than $900 per student would
be allowed to use that excess so long as the total per pupil expenditure did not exceed some
maximum ratio of $900, such as 125 percent.

